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One of the reforms that have to be launched in a future unification process in Korea, 
which seems possible after the political negotiations last year, is the transformation of 
the North Korean banking system. The question arises whether Korea could profit from 
the German experience where banking transformation was one of the rather few success 
stories in unification. In 1990 the East German banking transformation was achieved re-
latively fast and uncomplicated due to considerable direct investments of the West 
German banks compounded with state guarantees for bad loans resulting from the credit 
business with existing GDR-corporations. Unfortunately, South Korea currently lacks 
some major prerequesites that contributed to the German banking unification, among 
them – and probably the most important one – is the lack of a sound and efficient ban-
king system that could become active in the North. Consequently, depending on the cir-
cumstances of a future Korean unification either a more gradual process is recommen-
ded or, if inner-Korean migration requires a more dynamic transition, considerable in-
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* This study results from a research stay in October 2000 at the Bank of Korea (BOK) 
in Seoul. The author would like to thank the Research Department of BOK for their va-
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in Korea contributed to this study by commenting on the topics. The Deutsche Bundes-
bank released data about Germany's banking unification. Nevertheless, none of them is 
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I. INTRODUCTION   
 
After decades of seperation and cold war (including several bloody clashes) between 
North and South Korea, in the year 2000 both countries made more than a considerable 
progress in improving their relationship – a reunification does not seem utopian any 
longer, it is a real perspective now. However, when the two Koreas will be unified a-
mong the numerous problems that have to be solved one is very decisive: the creation of 
a joint and competitive banking system. Efficiently working banks are a critical prere-
quisite for a stable and dynamic economic development process (FRY 1993). The recent 
crisis in South Korea and other Asian countries is only one example of mis-
developments in financial intermediation with severe implications for the whole eco-
nomy. Thus, the question is how to implement a process that will lead to unified and ef-
ficient Korean financial intermediation.  
 
At present, there does not exist a North Korean banking system that could be unified 
with the one in the South. Consequently, it will be less a unification but rather the foun-
dation of market-oriented financial institutions in North Korea, performed under the as-
sistance of South Korea. This resembles the German unification in 1990 when East 
Germany needed a market-oriented banking system. However, in the German unificati-
on economic differences were not as striking as those between North and South Korea. 
Moreover, a further problem arises if the Korean unification came soon because at pre-
sent even without the unification South Korea faces enough problems in its banking 
system.  
 
The following analysis will deal with these topics in more detail. The first section (II) 
starts with a short description of Germany's banking system (East and West) prior its 
unification and will then analyse the unification experience. In the subsequent section 
(III) present conditions will be described for North and South Korea in terms of econo-
mic situation and banking system structure. This will identify main parallels and diffe-
rences between German and Korean unification. Subsequently, some lessons will be 
drawn for a strategy of future banking unification in Korea, either by a very gradual 
process or by a fast process of banking unification. Altogether, the analysis cannot serve 
as a final instruction for policy-makers on how to perform a banking unification. Yet, 





II.  GERMANY'S EXPERIENCE OF BANKING UNIFICATION  
 
1.  Banking system – A short survey  
 
At the end of World War II Germany was seperated into four sections, which were 
controlled by British, French, American and Russian military. In 1949 the three wes-
tern-controlled sections became the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), 
whereas the section under Russian authority became the German Democratic Republic 
(East Germany). Because of the affiliation with two different political and economic 
blocks for decades contacts between West and East Germany were rather limited. The-
refore, economic development and banking system development were quite different.  
 
a)  West Germany  
 
After the war West Germany restructured its universal banking system, a system that 
was traditionally predominant in Germany. This banking system prevails until today 
and, thus, was existent at the time of unification, too. This system is characterized by 
the following institutions (graphically summarized in figure 1):1  
-  a central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) with a network of branches (Landeszent-
ralbanken) for the province level; the Bundesbank is mainly responsible for mo-
netary policy and refinancing tasks,2 it is independent from direct government 
orders;  
-  credit banks (or commercial banks) that can be divided into the "big banks",3 re-
gional banks (including other credit banks) and branches of foreign banks;  
-  savings banks, which are non-commercial institutions, the solvency of which is 
guaranteed by the local community; public land banks serve as a central institute 
(Girozentrale) for savings banks; savings banks hold shares of land banks;  
-  credit cooperatives on the province level (e.g. Volksbanken, Raiffeisenbanken) 
and regional institutions of credit cooperatives (including the head institute DG 
Bank) providing subsidiary services for credit cooperatives;  
-  mortgage banks that have an important function for housing financing;  
-  banks with special functions, such as financing small and medium firms or start-
ups – some of these intermediaries are in public ownership (Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau and Deutsche Ausgleichsbank);  
                                                 
1  This survey follows mainly the official statistics of DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (2000).  
2  A further institution (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen) supervises credit business.  
3  At the time of unification the big banks were Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank. Re-




-  other financial institutions (e.g. building and loans associations).  
 
Figure 1 
Structure of the West German banking system  
Credit banks  (or
commercial banks)
Central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank)



























Altogether, at the time of unification (and also before and later on) West Germany was 
characterized by the classical banking system in free market economies: a two-stage-
system with the central bank on the one hand and commercial banks as well as other in-
termediaries on the other. This system was open to foreign entrants and competitive. 
Yet due to a strong banking supervision this competition was not completely free – in 
fact, supervision was more prudential (and more regulative) than for example in the U-





b)  East Germany  
 
Until 1945 there was no difference between banking in West and East Germany. 
Though after Germany had been seperated existing private banks were nationalized un-
der the Russian occupation and only some credit cooperatives remained formally as pri-
vate institutions. Several new state-run financial institutions were founded. Since that 
time there has not been any private banking in East Germany until unification. Interest 
rates, credit volumes and credit recipients were determined by a state planning system. 
When finally the Berlin Wall fell and the socialist rule came to its end (1989/90) the 
banking system in East Germany contained the following institutions (summarized in 
figure 2):  
-  State Bank of the GDR (Staatsbank der DDR) acted both as the central bank and 
a credit bank; it financed and controlled the major part of the economy and offe-
red also insurance;  
- German  Merchant  Bank  (Deutsche Handelsbank) served for accounting, finan-
cing and controlling the trade of East German corporations with non-socialist 
countries;  
-  German Bank for Foreign Trade (Deutsche Außenhandelsbank) had a similar as-
signment as the German Merchant Bank but for trade and other kind of financial 
relations with socialist countries;  
-  Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry (Bank für Landwirtschaft und Nah-
rungsgüterwirtschaft) financed and controlled the agricultural sector and the 
food industry;  
-  Cooperative savings institutions serving for some different sectors;  
-  Savings banks that mainly offered savings accounts to private customers, but al-
so allocated a limited amount of credits to this group (especially for young fami-
lies);  
-  Other special institutions such as postal savings and railways savings.  
 
Similar or even more than in western countries, financial institutions in socialist count-
ries have a decisive position in the economy. By planning, financing and controlling 
corporations banks have a significant influence on business. Consequently, banks in so-
cialist countries depend to a large extent on the government. In this context it is impor-
tant to note that East Germany did not possess any two-stage-banking-system like Wes-
tern market economies, but did not have a pure monopoly-banking-system (that has 
been taught by Marxism-Leninism), too. Instead, East Germany's banking system was 
characterized by different institutions, among them – and most important but not alone 




financed and controlled corporations as well.4 Despite the existence of several financial 
institutions there did not exist any real competition in banking, neither for credits nor 
for savings.  
 
Figure 2 
Structure of the East German banking system prior to unification  






















2.  Unification and banking system development  
 
It was more than surprising when in autumn 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, the East German 
government collapsed, a democratization process started and finally the unification was 
evident. Thus, government and corporations in West Germany were not prepared to uni-
fy. Yet still, as a result of this lack of knowledge about the implementation of this pro-
cess, a euphoria grew, which made decision-making in terms of economic rationality ra-
ther difficult – especially because the following year was a general election year. In this 
situation the unification process was implemented within a very short period, mainly by 
the Monetary, Economic and Social Union (MESU) established on the 1
st July 1990. 
The rates set in the MESU for the exchange of the East German currency into the newly 
introduced West German currency (Deutschmark) were far from justified by the produc-
tivity of East German firms.5 Moreover, with the MESU East Germany liberalized most 
                                                 
4  Therefore, in figure 2 exists a direct arrow between the central bank and customers. In West Germany 
there is no any relation like this for the central bank (see figure 1).  
5  That mis-development was further increased by wage rises. Consequently, East Germany had signifi-
cant cost-disadvantages and was not competitive for internationally traded products. As a consequen-
ce, even today East Germany's integration into foreign trade is still weak. Certainly, it is necessary to 
mention that the openess of the border between East and West Germany since the 9th November 1989 




commodity prices and abolished various subsidies; along with the adoption of West 
German economic laws this was a major step for the integration of markets. In addition, 
with the 1
st July existing East German state-owned corporations came under the control 
of the Treuhand, an institution responsible for the privatization process.  
 
Concerning the banking system there did not exist any links between East and West 
Germany until November 1989. Financing East-West-trade had not been a business so 
far, nor was there any kind of physical infiltration (by branches or representative of-
fices). Thus, similar to the industrial sector banks were not prepared for unification. In 
this situation it was very doubtful if existing East German banks could survive without 
any partnership of other banks in a unification: East German banks' staff lacked the 
knowledge of financial techniques essential in a market economy; banks were burdened 
with loans having allocated in the pre-unification period that became non-performing 
after unification; a further organizational problem was the adoption of the West German 
payment and clearing system. Therefore, for many observers the best way to implement 
the unification seemed to be a takeover of the existing East German financial instituti-
ons by West German intermediaries.  
 
The following steps characterize the main events of transformation in the banking sys-
tem:  
-  While West German commercial bank began to open first offices in East Ger-
many (notably offices, not representative offices), West German savings banks 
started supporting their East German counterparts in preparing for market eco-
nomy by consulting as well as financial and technical assistance (since Novem-
ber 1989).  
-  The State Bank of the GDR lost its functions and capacities as a credit bank to 
the newly-founded Deutsche Kreditbank (for East Germany without Berlin) and 
the Berliner Stadtbank (for the city of Berlin).6 The Deutsche Kreditbank foun-
ded two joint-ventures with the two leading West German banks (Deutsche Bank 
and Dresdner Bank).7 The Berliner Stadtbank was overtaken by the Berliner 
Bank, the leading bank in West Berlin. West German and foreign banks received 
permissions for representative offices in East Germany. Thus, offices could be 
converged into formal representative offices, notably not branches (1
st of April 
1990).  
                                                                                                                                               
mans to the west that had to be stopped. Yet unrealistic exchange rates and high wages were obviously 
no solution because unemployment steadily grew in Germany in the early 1990s and migration conti-
nued especially for the first years of unification (and exists still today).  
6  Until July 1990 the State Bank of the GDR continued fuctioning as the central bank for East Germany.  
7  Later both joint-ventures merged with their West German partner banks (for the Dresdner Bank's stra-




-  With the MESU West German financial laws were introduced in East Germany 
(only a few exceptions remained until the formal act of the state unification in 
October 1990). West German and foreign banks could now operate branches in 
East Germany and with the MESU the Deutsche Bundesbank became the central 
bank for East and West Germany (1
st of July 1990).  
 
In May 1990 the Bundesbank opened an office in West Berlin that moved some weeks 
later to East Berlin. Several members of the Bundesbank-staff were sent to East Germa-
ny at that time. Among other tasks, this staff was training East German personnel. The 
Bundesbank used the method of "godparenthood" (Patenschaft), meaning West German 
departments and sub-institutions of the Bundesbank became a sort of "godfather" for 
similar institutions that had been established in East Germany.  
 
A further important task for the government was the enlargement of West Germany's 
banking supervision to East Germany. To guarantee a qualified banking supervision ex-
ternal auditors were used apart from existing staff in West German state banking super-
vision. Moreover, existing banks in East Germany (mainly Deutsche Kreditbank, inclu-
ding its joint venture, savings banks and credit cooperatives) had to be compensated by 
the government for their bad loans. This was necessary to ensure equal competition with 
western banks and to meet Basle-standards of capital-ratio. To secure depositors' confi-
dence in banks a political consensus was found, according to which no existing GDR-
bank would become insolvent. Yet, existing banks in East Germany had been burdened 
with loans to former state-owned firms that faced serious solvency problems with the 
start of the MESU. These firms were now under control of the Treuhand the task of 
which was to decide which firm could be privatized and which one had to be closed. 
Thus, the future of former state-owned corporations depended more on the Treuhand 
than on banks that mainly renewed existing credits for those firms on the risk of the 
Treuhand.8 This risk-assignment to the Treuhand (instead of to banks) was not cheap for 
the government but favorable for banks and the East German economy insofar as banks 
could concentrate their own-risked credit business on new corporations (MEINECKE 
1993, pp. 90-92). Thus, East Germany was provided very early with a banking system 
that was free from former financial burden.  
 
                                                 
8  At the end of 1992 40 % of commercial loans from the nine largest commercial banks were allocated 
to Treuhand firms, among them nearly 90 % were fully guaranteed by the Treuhand (DEEG 1994 ,p. 
31-32). However, banks consulted the Treuhand for their selection of surviving and non-surviving 




With legal restrictions widely abolished, an integration process by the market could 
start in July 1990. Nonetheless, of course, Germany were not immediately provided 
with a unified and efficient banking system, it was a process. In the commercial banking 
sector, West Germany's private banks went to East Germany partially by a takeover of 
existing GDR-banks (and their branches) and partly by creating a new network of bran-
ches in East Germany. The lack in infrastructure and human capital significantly impe-
ded financial business at that time in East Germany (MANN 1996, pp. 48-49). 
Infrastructure deficits existed especially with respect to buildings and telecommunicati-
on (which was a serious problem in East Germany in the early 1990s). Thus, the ope-
ning-process of new branches occurred frequently in an improvising manner, i.e. some 
branches were founded as an interim solution in buses or containers as adequate buil-
dings were not available. Especially those banks running a non-takeover-strategy in E-
ast Germany were confronted with an infrastructure problem. Yet also those banks that 
had decided for a takeover of East German banks faced difficulties, due to the need of 
transforming existent socialist-oriented bank staff into market-oriented bankers. This 
implied a strong need for education efforts all the more because these banks had a wide 
customer base (that asked for information about the various new financial products) and 
existing staff was not familiar with products such as bonds, shares etc. 
 
Concerning human capital weakness, three strategies were applied: the transfer of Wes-
tern bank staff to East Germany, the training of existing bank staff of former GDR-
banks and the training of newly hired personnel. The two joint-venture banks of the 
Deutsche Kreditbank (with Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank) faced a significant hu-
man capital problem because of their large size compounded with the commitment to 
guarantee most existing jobs in these banks. For a limited time, in some branches the 
principle of two branch-managers was used to perform the bank transformation: one 
manager from the West who was responsible for bank knowledge, and another one from 
the East who had contacts to and knowledge about local business. West German banks 
that started a more limited business in East Germany and therefore did not found any 
joint ventures, relied rather on experienced staff in existing branches in the West that 
was sent into the East (or on personnel having been hired after unification). Most in-
vesting western banks used a sort of regional godparenthood to spread the burden of 
personnel and logistical assistance to various West German branches. In the long-run 
the joint-venture-strategy paid-off for Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank because they 
had received both existing bank branches and an access to a broad customer base, e-
nabling them to get a high market share in both credit and savings business. Until today 




built-up their own network of branches lag behind these two banks in terms of market 
shares.  
 
In contrast to credit banks there has not been any direct investment for savings banks 
and credit cooperatives in East Germany. This was due to the principle of regional limi-
tations for these kinds of financial intermediaries. Nevertheless, savings banks and cre-
dit cooperatives from West Germany supported their eastern counterparts as they had an 
interest in the survival of these institutions in East Germany under the newly established 
market economy. This assistance for their counterparts was performed – similar to the 
Bundesbank and credit banks – by a regional godparenthood as well.9  
 
Apart from private credit banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives also public 
banks with special functions contributed to the banking system development in East 
Germany (DEEG 1994, p. 24). For example the KfW and the Deutsche Ausgleichsbank 
supported East German firms by providing them with various credit programs. Especial-
ly KfW's contribution was significant. KfW itself had lent 20 billion DM to the East in 
June 1992 (which was more than just significant when considering that at this time the 
nine largest banks together had lent a sum of approximately 40 billion DM to non-
Treuhand-firms in East Germany).10 The credit programs of these public banks were fo-
cussed especially on start-ups and small firms that had been neglected by the free mar-
ket mechanism in banking. Even today credit programs exclusively reserved for East 
German firms still exist. Altogether, the state highly contributed to the dynamic deve-
lopment of the banking business after unification (DEEG 1994, p. 37-38).  
 
The branch presence of banks in East Germany considerably increased after the unifica-
tion (see Table 1). At the beginning of the transformation East Germany was characteri-
zed by an "under-banking" compared to West Germany; yet in the course of time this 
difference in branch presence decreased. A lack of bank presence prevailed in East 
Germany, especially for credit banks and "others" in the early 1990s, whereas various 
branches of savings banks and credit cooperatives had already existed in the pre-
unification era. Thus, in the early 1990s especially credit banks were very busy in inc-
reasing their presence in the East. Until 1996 the overall number of branches for credit 
banks increased in East Germany, for savings banks it was growing until 1997 and only 
credit cooperatives reached their highest presentation relatively early (in 1993). Later 
                                                 
9  For the transformation of the different kinds of financial institutions see also DEEG (1994), pp. 9-21.  




on, bank presence was decreasing in East Germany – a process that had already been a 
general trend in West Germany as a result of rationalization, too. Interestingly, the num-
ber of branches for cooperative banks has decreased in East Germany below its pre-





Table 1:  
Banks' Branches in East and West Germany, 1990-1999  


























Number of branches   Residents 
per 
branch   
Number of branches   Residents 
per 
branch   
1990 464  2,131 1,849  151  3,488  5,968  17,250 15,684 858  1,603 
1991 606  2,478 2,213  463  2,741  6,042  17,130 15,551 3,434  1,530 
1992 854  2,655 2,204  611  2,480  6,225  16,923 15,451 4,259  1,523 
1993 881  2,760 2,139  631  2,433  6,255  16,750 15,286 4,417  1,539 
1994 983  2,788 2,098  705  2,362  6,149  16,483 15,109 4,406  1,566 
1995 1,022  2,790  2,014  5,023  1,426  6,027 16,281 14,985 19,788  1,162 
1996 1,029  2,773  1,871  4,880  1,462  6,015 16,122 14,913 19,060  1,187 
1997 1,002  2,805  1,777  3,880  1,624  5,840 15,946 14,799 17,137  1,241 
1998 994  2,755 1,685 3,565  1,699  5,839  15,572 14,317 15,202  1,311 
1999 924  2,710 1,619 3,436  1,751  5,943  14,957 14,044 14,913  1,343 
a) Without Berlin; b) including Berlin; c) since 1995 postal savings have been included in bank statistics 
(summarized in the category "others"); d) size of population/number of all branches.  
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank  
 
Despite the banks' efforts after the unification to increase their presence East Germany 
still lags behind West Germany in terms of branch-density (size of population/number 
of branches). Certainly, the branch presence has been accelerating since 1990, and 
further rationalizations in West Germany could reduce the present East-West-
difference. Obviously, though, a lower branch density for East Germany continues. Ne-
vertheless, today the financial services supply in East Germany is similar to the one in 
the West. All financial products offered in West Germany are supplied in East Germa-
ny, too.  
 
Table 2 and 3 entail banks' market shares for deposit and loan business since 1992.11 
For deposits market, shares were relatively stable in the 1990s, both for East and West 
Germany. Obviously, savings banks defended the major part of their deposits market 
share in East Germany and, thus, their traditional role in the former GDR for collecting 
savings; even nowadays the majority of deposits and other kind of savings are still held 
                                                 
11 Data for 1990 and 1991 is not included in these tables because official banking statistics is not very re-
liable for that time due to reporting problems of branches. Moreover, until 1991 statistics is distorted 




at savings banks, compared to a market share of less than 30 per cent for savings banks 
in West Germany. Another interesting difference is the weak position of "other banks" 
in East Germany compared to a deposit market share of 31 per cent in the West.  
 
Table 2:  
Market shares of banks for deposits and other savingsa (in %) 

















1992  22.7 59.9 16.6  0.8  20.8 32.1 21.5 25.7 
1993  22.6 59.4 16.6  1.3  21.1 32.0 21.7 25.2 
1994  21.7 59.3 16.7  2.3  19.5 31.9 22.0 26.6 
1995  21.0 58.9 17.4  2.7  19.0 31.5 22.0 27.5 
1996  21.5 58.4 17.0  3.1  19.6 30.7 21.5 28.2 
1997  20.3 59.1 16.8  3.8  19.7 30.8 21.4 28.0 
1998  20.4 58.4 16.5  4.7  20.3 30.7 21.3 28.0 
1999  20.1 59.7 16.6  3.6  22.9 28.4 20.1 31.3 
a)  Domestic non-banks deposits and other savings; b) without Berlin; c) including Berlin.  
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank  
 
In contrast to the deposit business, credit banks could defend their position as the main 
loan supplier in East Germany, which astonishes when considering a nearly steady dec-
rease of credit banks in West Germany for loans in the past. Another interesting result is 
the rise of intermediaries summarized under the term "other banks". Only a few of these 
intermediaries existed in the early transformation years and still today they largely igno-
re the savings business. For loans, however, their market shares rose above 20 per cent. 
Compared to West Germany "other banks" still lack importance, though. A further out-
come of the banking unification is the decreasing role of credit cooperatives in East 
Germany in the loan business (which today is small, even compared with West Germa-
ny). Altogether, even a decade after unification the market share structure of East and 
West Germany still differs.  
 
In addition to their credit and deposit business banks became also active in the privati-
zation of Treuhand-firms. Especially credit banks contributed to this process by using 
their investment banking capabilities or by arranging and financing mangement-buy-
outs. Moreover, banks consulted firms regarding the internal reconstruction, export 





Table 3:  
Market shares of banks for loansa (in %)  
 East  Germanyb   West Germanyc  













tive banks  
Other 
banks  
1992  43.2 38.3 14.5  4.0  26.9 22.2 12.8 38.1 
1993  37.1 39.2 13.6 10.0 23.9 22.2 12.8 41.1 
1994  34.9 37.1 12.3 15.7 24.1 22.8 13.4 39.8 
1995  33.6 34.5 11.7 20.2 23.9 22.6 13.4 40.1 
1996  33.2 32.5 10.8 23.4 23.8 22.3 13.3 40.6 
1997  35.9 29.6  9.8  24.8 23.2 22.2 13.3 41.4 
1998  35.8 28.8  9.4  26.0 22.9 22.0 13.2 41.9 
1999  37.7 30.6  9.7  22.0 22.5 20.9 12.6 44.2 
a) Credits to domestic non-banks; b) without Berlin; c) including Berlin.  
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank  
 
Despite various efforts and activities described so far, several problems could not be 
avoided:  
-  Due to a lack of creditworthiness for a considerable part of the East German in-
dustry during the early years of transformation, banks were facing higher credit 
risks. Especially private credit banks accepted these risks as they were searching 
for market shares that would bring about profits in the future (DEEG 1994, p. 
33). Moreover, the public opinion (in both East and West) demanded and expec-
ted a generous credit policy for East Germany. However, as explained before e-
xisting staff in former GDR-banks frequently lacked the knowledge for alloca-
ting credits according to profitability aspects. Also, staff from the West had dif-
ficulties in evaluating East German firms' creditworthiness in the early 1990s 
(all the more because of a lack of reliable firm-balances in the beginning of the 
transformation). This resulted for some banks in non-performing loans that had 
to be compensated by the banks' more profitable business in the West; in this 
context it is important to note that those compensations were an advantage for 
the takeover-strategy, since independent East German banks could not be trusted 
on such reserves.  
-  In the course of time in particular credit banks became increasingly reluctant to 
allocate credits because of the lack of collateral and reputation for East German 
firms (THIEßEN 1998, pp. 201-204). Instead of increasing interest rates banks 
frequently responded to higher credit risks by reducing the credit supply to a le-
vel that was not satisfying the market demand (credit rationing).12 Thus, firms, 
especially small ones, increasingly faced a credit-shortage.  
-  While West German banks introduced their system for conducting payments, 
East German savings banks and the Deutsche Kreditbank continued for some 
                                                 
12 STIGLITZ/WEISS (1981) have shown that banks can decrease their profitability by setting market e-




time to use their own, formerly existing payment system. This dualism caused 
serious delays for payments, threatening economic transactions at the beginning 
of the transformation (MANN 1996, pp. 50 and PUCHTA 1993, pp. 24-25).  
 
Nevertheless, altogether the German banking unification can be regarded as a success, 
especially when compared to unification in other economic sectors.13 Western banks 
made considerable investments in East Germany, employment in the banking business 
has been growing since the unification and financial services supply has converged to 
the Western level. Moreover, a banking system instability did not exist, and only a mo-
derate (and short-run) increase in inflation occurred after unification. Certainly, the ban-
king unification was implemented by a takeover of the West. Critics may object that the 
development of a banking system could have been accomplished entirely by East 
German intermediaries and that this would have been a more valuable solution. Howe-
ver, two aspects arguing for the takeover strategy have to be considered. Firstly, owing 
to East Germany's lack of banking skills a financial development without western part-
ners would have been a long lasting process with the risk of a severe banking crisis if 
East German financial intermediaries banks had failed. Secondly, the aim was a unifica-
tion and not a continuing separation of East and West, neither in industrial nor in finan-
cial respects. Thus, experienced and well-funded western banks were highly qualified to 
found a banking system. And eventually it also has to be realized that banks normally 
do not pursue special regional interests, they are profit-oriented intermediaries that do 
not discriminate between East and West.  
 
3.  A few lessons  
 
Altogether, the German experience is an interesting case study of major issues to be 
considered in banking system unification. Among the most relevant lessons are the fol-
lowing:  
-  Unification can cause a non-performing-loans-problem because existing firms in 
the transformation economy may become bankrupt once the transformation has 
started. In Germany this bad debt was taken to a large extent by the government 
(meaning it became state debt).  
-  Banking unification by an overtaking of financial institutions of the less power-
ful country by the banks of the other one can work quite well if one of the unify-
ing partners has strong and competitive financial institutions. Otherwise there is 
the risk of a banking crisis.  
-  Credit rationing of banks can discriminate certain companies (especially small 
firms and start-ups). Thus, credit supply could be one topic of transformation po-
licy; in Germany banking unification was supported by the public credit pro-
grams and guarantees.  
                                                 
13 According to DEEG (1994, p. 22) "the banking industry itself is arguably the most successful case of a 




-  The transformation of financial institutions for a market economy is favored if 
institutional parallels exist for the unifying countries. In Germany for example 
savings banks and credit cooperatives existed both in the East and in the West 
before 1990. Therefore, these institutions in the East could be supported by their 
western counterparts.  
-  Banks from market economies investing in a transformation economy can not 
just contribute to the economic development by financial services supply, but 
they could also consult firms (regarding the internal reconstruction, export chan-
ces etc.), too. Moreover, banks can contribute to the privatization process by u-
sing their investment banking capabilities and, this way they can prepare the 
ground for industrial takeovers.  
 
However, Germany's banking system unification was carried out under specific conditi-
ons that do not quite exist in Korea. The four main prerequisites for Germany's banking 
unification were: (1) a state that was financially healthy enough to compensate investing 
western banks for bad loans that had resulted from credits to former GDR-corporations; 
(2) a qualified banking supervision; (3) institutional parallels between the two unifying 
banking systems; (4) the West German banking systems was competitive and sound, 
enabling it to make huge investments in East Germany. Only if these prerequisites exist 
in Korea, the German way of banking transformation could be a model. Thus, before 
applying the lessons drawn from the German experience, one needs to summarize the 
main pre-conditions prevailing for a Korean unification. This implies a discussion of 
some basics of Korean economic and bank development.  
 
III.  BANKING IN A KOREAN UNIFICATION PROCESS  
 
1.  General set-up in Korea – economic development and banking system  
 
At the end of the Japanese rule in 1945 Korea was divided into a northern state control-
led by a socialist government and a market-oriented one in the South. Since this separa-
tion the economic development has been very different for the two Korean countries, as 
contacts were more than limited after the end of the Korean War (1950-53).  
 
a)  North Korea  
 
In the decade following the Korean War it was initially North Korea that profited from a 
dynamic economic development. Estimations about North Korea's average growth rates 
vary but are high and probably above 15 %. The endowment with natural resources, 
some existing industrial development and high investment rates favored the economic 
development at that time.14 The North Korean economic policy was characterized by a 
                                                 
14 Still in the mid-1960s North Korea impressed many foreign visitors. Economist Joan Robinson (see 
ROBINSON 1965, cited in PARK 1994 p. 119) praised North Korea as a "miraculous success" and a 




steady enhancement of the state's impact on business. Consequently, in 1990 when the 
reform process in Eastern Europe and the USSR started North Korea remained as the 
most centralized-planned economy in the world (PARK 1994, pp. 112-114). Moreover, 
the economic policy was determined by the ideology of self-reliance (Juche). The eco-
nomy should become independent from international markets (products and technolo-
gy), even the influence of other socialist countries was limited. A further important fea-
ture, mainly since the 1960s, has been the high priority for military affairs, withdrawing 
resources from the industrial sector.15 As a consequence, since the 1960s North Korea's 
economic development has been stagnating. The country became increasingly isolated 
and its technological gap to other countries grew, contributing in a severe food-shortage 
in the 1990s.  
 
As the entire economy of North Korea its banking system was also created to a large ex-
tent according to the model of Russia and partly China. In 1946 58 existing financial in-
stitutions were nationalized and converged to the Central Bank of the Democratic Peo-
ple's Republic of Korea. Since then this bank has been serving both as the central bank 
and a credit bank by regulating money supply, offering a nationwide payment system,16 
financing and controlling organizations and corporations, serving as a depository insti-
tution and offering insurance. Each state organization, corporation and cooperative pos-
sesses an account at the central bank that strictly depends on the government and alloca-
tes funds according to state plans and priorities.  
 
In the course of time the North Korean banking system was complemented by speciali-
zed banks and some other financial institutions. The Foreign Trade Bank (built in 1959 
as an international branch of the central bank for foreign exchange transactions) and the 
Industrial Bank (built in 1964) can be regarded as specialized banks. A few further 
banks do exist, pursuing activities that are partly dubious or unknown abroad. Inte-
restingly, a few joint-ventures exist (under Japanese and Hongkong influence) that have 
                                                                                                                                               
national comparison North Korea showed a significant development progress making Robinson's sta-
tement more credible. At that time North Korea profited from an important characteristic of a centrali-
zed-planned economy, meaning the state could determine the national investment rate (and, thus, could 
set investments higher than they would be in a market economy – this contributed already in the 1930s 
to high growth rates in the USSR). In the 1960s South Korea copied this policy by restrictions that re-
duced private consumption and favored industrial investment.  
15 The increase in military spending since the early 1960s was caused by different reasons, among them a 
deteriorating relationship with the USSR, the China-Soviet-rift, the Cuban missile crisis and the esta-
bishment of a military government in South Korea. Moreover, North Korea participated in the Viet-
nam war (LEVIN 1982, cited in PARK 1994, p. 118). According to estimations, the North Korean 
forces comprise today approximately 2 million soldiers. In view of a population of approximately 22 
million this means that nearly 10 % of North Korean residents belong to the army – the percentage 
among adults is, of course, much higher.  
16 Here it is important to note that – as in many other socialist economies – only products for private con-
sumption (by private individuals) are transfered via financial payments while the exchange of goods 




functions such as attracting foreign exchange and technology transfer. Moreover, there 
is a Unification Promotion Bank and a postal savings system that was built in 1957, 
working independently from the central bank but not from the state (KIM 1994, p. 155). 
The banking system was completed by credit cooperatives controlled by the state since 
their nationalization in 1946.  
 
There have not been any banking system links with South Korea so far. However, 
despite recent developments other kinds of economic relations with South Korea are 
more than just limited, too. Consequently, at present there exits only a weak basis for a 
cooperation and unification process. The "sunshine-policy" of Kim Dae-Jung and the 
reply of Kim Jong-Il could change this.  
 
b)  South Korea  
 
During the 1950s and still in the 1960s South Korea's economic development lagged 
behind the North Korean one, due to a weak economic management in the early politi-
cal leadership in South Korea and, moreover, to the unfavorable pre-conditions for 
economic development (because of South Korea's low industrial level in the 1950s and 
its lack of natural resources). In 1961, though, a new military government established 
the system of a market economy that was containing the notion of a strong state that in-
fluenced economic developments via five-year-plans. Even today economists still dis-
cuss the controversial question of how efficiently this system of industrial policy wor-
ked. Banks frequently allocated "policy-loans" into weak and failing investments. Ho-
wever, government-restrictions for private consumption made industrial investments 
flourish. Thus, despite frequent misallocation economic development was highly dyna-
mic and impressive even in comparison with other Asian countries. Yet this process was 
financed by huge investments that called for high savings. In fact, one generation being 
forced by the government to refrain from consumption must live in poverty to enable 
the following generations to profit from prosperity.17 At present South Korea differs 
from other industrialized countries in the West, not really because of a much lower level 
of income but rather a still existing preference for state influence in the market process. 
Considering from this perspective South Korea resembles Japan.  
 
For financial intermediation, South Korea possesses today a diversified system compri-
sing various banks and non-bank financial institutions. This structure mainly developed 
in the early 1960s when the military government came into power. This regime assigned 
the financial system, and especially banks, a decisive rule for implementing industrial 
policy. In the early 1960s the few already existing banks were nationalized and various 
further banks have been founded since then, among them nationwide commercial banks, 
                                                 
17 Nowadays, reminiscences of former poverty are still existent for the older generation, whereas today's 




several specialized banks (acting in specific economic sectors, such as export, agricultu-
re, industry, housing etc.), regional banks and branches of foreign banks that started bu-
siness in 1967. Apart from that, numerous non-bank financial institutions were foun-
ded.18 Figure 3 summarizes this structure.  
 
Figure 3 


















In the course of time the importance of these different institutions was changing, a pro-
cess that was not the least influenced by a reformed regulative environment. The first 
liberalization measures were launched in the early 1980s with the foundation of some 
private nationwide commercial banks and the formal privatization of existing state-
owned nationwide commercial banks (yet the government continued to influence these 
banks, and owing to less restrictive regulations on non-bank financial institutions the 
banks' market share was decreasing). In the 1990s the liberalization process was accele-
rated: Interest rates were liberalized and banks were given more independence for credit 
allocation. However, due to the structural weakness in Korean industry (especially at 
some large chaebol with dubious diversification in the past), the resulting weakness of 
banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, a current account almost continuously in 
deficit in the 1990s and last but not least an alarming increase of short-term debt, South 
Korea was involved into the Asian crisis in late-1997.19  
 
A serious economic downturn in 1998 was following. Many corporations became insol-
vent and as a consequence various banks and especially non-bank financial institutions 
as well. Under the pressure and the financial assistance of the IMF the newly-elected 
                                                 
18 For an overview see BANK OF KOREA (1998).  
19 For an analysis of the causes for Asian crisis see FLYNN (1999). For South Korea's debt – long-term 




government initiated a restructuring process. A public assistance fund was founded the 
task of which was to rescue the banking as well as the financial system from bankrupt-
cy. Furthermore, the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) became respon-
sible for selling bad loans to the market. Due to the mergers and closures the number of 
banks and especially non-bank financial institutions was decreasing,20 staff was reduced 
and the shareholder structure of various banks changed; some banks received foreign 
partners.21 The banking supervision now performed by the Financial Supervisory Com-
mission (FSC) and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) was considerably impro-
ved22 and a deposit insurance was introduced. However, despite all these efforts the 
process of financial restructuring is not finished yet. The ratio of non-performing loans 
is still high for banks and also for non-bank financial institutions (see table 4).  
 
Table 4:  
Asset quality of banks and other financial institutions in South Korea (December 2000)  
  Bank   Non-Bank   Insurance   Securities   Total   












Substandard and below 











B/A (per cent)   8.0 34.0 8.5 52.6  10.4 
Net substandard and 
below loansa (in trillion 
















C/Ab (per cent)   3.4  21.9  3.3  29.4  4.8 
Non-performing loansc 











D/A (per cent)   5.6  32.9  5.6  52.6  8.1 
a)  Total substandard and below loans – loan loss provisions.  
b)  (Total substandard and below loans – loan loss provisions) / (total loans – loan loss provisions).  
c)  Includes all loans overdue for more than 3 months and non-accrual loans.   
Source: Financial Supervisory Service  
 
Some further data regarding South Korean banking is shown in table 5. As one can see, 
the overall capital ratio of banks has improved considerably, yet some banks still do not 
                                                 
20 See table A2 in appendix for institutional restructuring.  
21 For example in the case of commercial banks, two years after the crisis the number of banks (formerly 
33) decreased to 23 and staff was reduced by 34 per cent. Moreover, various non-bank financial insti-
tutions – especially merchant banks (that had been highly involved in the crisis) – were closed, 
suspended or otherwise dissolved.  
22 For example since April 1998 all those banks failing to meet the 8%-capital adequacy ratio (according 
to the Bank for International Settlement) have become subject of "prompt corrective actions" (automa-




meet the BIS capital ratio of 8 per cent; also, owing to still existing problems in the in-
dustrial sector (many corporations, including some chaebol, are still in trouble) a new 
increase of non-performing loans could be possible, which would further deteriorate the 
capital-ratio of banks. Moreover, due to writting off non-performing loans the overall 
profitability of banks is still negative, whereas the reduction of banks' staff has stagna-
ted (after a considerable decrease in 1998 when the restructuring process started). Vari-
ous banks are still burdened with excessive staff while lacking simultaneously qualified 
personnel. Many bank managers have not changed their attitude and continue behaving 
more like state officials than profit-oriented bankers. Thus, a new round of financial 
restructuring and reforms is on the way.  
 
Table 5:  
South Korea's domestic commercial banking system  
 Capital  ratio   
(per cent)  
Return on assets  
(per cent)  
Staff  
















1996 8.97  10.15  0.23  0.47 83,749  20,164 
1997 6.66  9.60  -0.90  -1.17  94,065  19,929 
1998 8.22  8.31  -2.99  -5.83  64,830  10,847 
1999 10.79  11.36  -1.42  -0.11  -  - 
2000 10.75a 11.19a -0.53  -1.07  64,759a 8,642a 
a) March 2000.  
Source: Financial Supervisory Service  
 
Altogether, in banking terms South Korea is still suffering from structural and human 
resource problems, which would be serious obstacles if the unification process will be 
initiated very soon. Nevertheless, despite existing problems it has to be acknowledged 
that the restructuring in South Korea was executed faster than in other countries invol-
ved in the Asian crisis. Already in 1999 South Korea returned to a high growth rate 
(10.7 %).23 Thus, in spite of the recent decrease of economic growth it seems that the 
economic distance to North Korea will further increase.  
 
2.  Strategies for unification  
 
a)  Gradualism versus shock – the general strategy for unification  
 
As shown in section II, Germany's banking system unification can generally be conside-
red as a success story. However, the prerequisites for the German unification in 1990 
                                                 




were quite different from those in the Korean banking system at present. Out of the pre-
requisites identified in section II. 3 Korea's debt level (state debt) may be regarded as 
the most favorable requirement. Thanks to a present debt/GDP-ratio of less than 40 per 
cent,24 which is low in comparison to Asian and even European countries, there is still 
space for government action to compensate those South Korean banks facing an increa-
sing bad loan problem when investing in North Korea (prerequisite 1). Yet in contrast to 
Germany South Korea does not have a tradition of a qualified banking supervision. Cer-
tainly, as described before, as a result of the financial crisis South Korea had conside-
rably improved its banking supervision but it is very doubtful if this step will make it al-
ready possible to meet future lending practices in a reformed North Korean banking 
system (prerequisite 2). Furthermore, Korea cannot really profit from some institutional 
parallels between the two banking systems. At present North Korea lacks much more 
financial institutions that could be unified or cooperating with counterparts in the South 
than East Germany during unification (prerequisite 3). Yet the most important differen-
ce between the German banking unification and a Korean one at present would be the 
absence of a sound banking system in South Korea. Despite government efforts for fi-
nancial restructuring, both South Korean banks and non-bank financial institutions are 
still burdened with non-performing loans and structural weaknesses, such as personnel 
overcapacity (while suffering at the same time from a lack of professional banking ca-
pacities) (prerequisite 4).  
 
Yet there are not only differences between the German past and the Korean future unifi-
cation in terms of banking. One can mention two further, more general obstacles to a 
unification in Korea requiring a different overall unification-strategy compared to the 
German one:  
-  The ratio of North Korean to South Korean population is approximately 45 to 20 
million at present, meaning it is much less favorable than the German one 
(which was 60 to 16 million in 1990); compared to the German case this implies 
a higher financial burden on each South Korean citizen.  
-  There is lack in reliable data regarding North Korea's economic output, although 
it can be assumed that the gap between the South and North Korean economic 
development is considerably higher than the German economic disparities in 
1990; again this will demand further sacrifices from South Korean citizens.  
 
In addition, there is another difference that might be the decisive one: the existence of a 
unification experience. Whereas the Germans have started their unification without any 
useful example from the past,25 the Koreans do have the chance to learn from the Ger-
man model. And because of this German example (resulting in high financial obligati-
                                                 
24 See table A4 in appendix.  
25 There was the example of the Vietnamese unification in the 1970s. However, this was not just a unifi-
cation of two agricultural economies. Unlike the German unification, the Vietnamese one resulted in a 




ons and a weak East German economy even a decade after unification) the Koreans are 
today much more realistic about unification prospects than the Germans, who had rather 
naive expectations in 1990. Moreover, the general solidarity between North and South 
Koreans might be less intense than the one among the Germans in 1990 due to civil war 
experience (1950-1953) and a long cold war period; in contrast to Korea, there has ne-
ver been any kind of military conflict between the two German states and thanks to fre-
quent visits of West Germans in East Germany (which became relatively easy in the 
1970s) it was possible to maintain an inner-German solidarity.  
 
Altogether, considering the high costs of the German unification and the continuing 
transformation deficits in East Germany (in terms of productivity, income and employ-
ment) the German model does not seem very attractive to the Koreans. That is why the 
people in South Korea are much less enthusiastic about a future unification. Neverthe-
less, most of them agree on a cooperation with the North, which might some day bring 
about unification, as long as this implies a very gradual process. It can be assumed that 
the government in Seoul will resist against any fast political, economic and social integ-
ration as it has happened in Germany – even if the government in Pyongyang would ask 
for it. The present economic disparities would cause unification costs exceeding pro-
bably South Korean willingness and ability to spend. However, the length of time and 
the course of the unification in Korea do not entirely depend on South Korean preferen-
ces. A sudden collapse of the Pyongyang government could result in a migration to the 
South, which may force the government in Seoul to take responsibility for North Korea 
and implement a relatively fast unification process. A government collapse in Pyongy-
ang may, at present, not seem very realistic. However, what will happen if the North 
Korean economy will worsen yet further?26  
 
Consequently, there can be different scenarios for unification, depending on the econo-
mic and the political stability in the North. In the following sections two different sce-
narios will be analyzed. One of them is based on the assumption that the situation in 
North Korea will remain stable. The other scenario assumes a soon collapse of the soci-
alist rule in Pyongyang, which would result in a less gradual process of unification.  
 
b)  Banking cooperation in a gradual unification process – scenario 1  
 
A gradual process of unification allowing a long-term transition for the North Korean 
economy could be implemented in a political confederation or a special economic zone 
in the North, which will be transformed gradually (ELI 1996, p. 48). Even a Chinese-
like unification as in Hongkong may be a choice ("one country, two systems") for a li-
mited period of time with a full integration of the two economic systems later on. In the 
                                                 
26 In East Germany the government seemed to be very stable until summer of 1989, too, but within just a 




following section a gradual transition process of the North Korean banking system is 
sketched, and it will be shown how banks from South Korea may contribute to this pro-
cess.  
 
For the transformation of the North Korean socialist banking system into a market ori-
ented one, a reform process with different stages is recommended. First of all, the insti-
tutional structure for a market oriented banking system has to be created (stage 1). 
Then, a gradual increase of domestic banking competition has to be achieved by libera-
lizing financial intermediaries market conduct (stage 2). In this phase foreign capital 
inflows should be allowed, in a regulated manner, though. Finally, financial intermedia-
tion could be opened to foreign capital inflows by liberalizing capital account restricti-
ons (stage 3).27 In the end a full unification between the two Korean banking systems 
could be implemented. The velocity of this banking system transition depends on the 
speed of the overall transition in the North Korean economy.  
 
Table 6 summarizes some major reform measures necessary for the different stages of 
transition in North Korea (including possible South Korean contributions to this process 
– the complex matter of banking restructuring in South Korea is not analyzed in this 
section but will be of course a major prerequisite for a Korean banking unification). All 
reforms mentioned in this summary are important but the most critical one will be pro-
bably the creation of a strong and efficient system of banking supervision. Without this 
supervision the other measures of financial liberalization described in table 6 could cau-
se practices of excessive risk taking and fraud among banks and other intermediaries, 
which would threaten the economic stability (including the political acceptance for the 
entire reform process).28  
 
As learnt by the example of the German unification institutional parallels can have a fa-
vorable effect on the unification of banking systems, meaning in terms of institutional 
reforms that new laws and institutions introduced in the future North Korean banking 
system should be the same or similar to those existent in South Korea at present. This is 
another reason why South Korea should be involved in a North Korean banking reform 
process. Also, macroeconomic stability is a further "must" to implement a successful fi-
nancial liberalization.29 In general this implies a consistent macroeconomic policy, 
                                                 
27  For the sequencing of financial system reform see VILLANUEVA/MIRAKHOR (1990), 
BISAT/JOHNSTON/SUNDARARAJAN (1992) and FRY (1995), pp. 461-471.  
28 A special case of lack of supervision and resulting fraud on financial practices was the transformation 
process in Albania. However, fraud and weak credit management as a consequence of a lack of super-
vision was observed in various reforming countries – both in the transformation process in Eastern Eu-
rope (in the Czech Republic just recently), in the former Soviet Union and in reforming developing 
countries (or emerging markets), too. Frequently, these banking problems resulted in a general econo-
mic crisis.  




especially with regard to monetary and exchange rate policy and – in this transformati-
on context – a successful privatization process as well.  
 
Table 6:  
North Korean banking transition and South Korean assistance  
  Reform measures in the North Korean banking system  Contributions of the South Korean 
banking systema  
Stage 1  Reforming existing financial institutions to commerci-
al banks (e.g. via privatization) and foundation of 
further commercial banks as well as other financial in-
termediaries  to receive the structure of a competitive 
banking business (these institutions can be private, 
half private or run by local communities depending on 
the overall speed of economic transition)  
South Korean banks can consult e-
xisting northern financial institutions 
with respect to commercial banking 
practices. Moreover, South Korean 
banks can invest in North Korean fi-
nancial institutions 
  Foundation of development banks to overcome credit 
shortage of special groups (because of credit market 
failure such as credit rationing)  
Consulting assistance from South 
Korean specialized banks and deve-
lopment institutions  
  The central bank hands over its functions as a credit 
bank to the newly arising commercial banks and other 
intermediaries  
Assistance by the Bank of Korea  
  Enabling the central bank to fulfill its monetary func-
tions by introducing sufficient monetary instruments  
Assistance by the Bank of Korea  
  Establishing a system of prudential supervision with 
(a) a strong supervising institution and (b) regulations 
forcing intermediaries to act soundly and avoid exces-
sive risk taking (e.g. by introducing single borrower 
limits)  
Consulting services of South Korean 
supervision capabilities (Financial 
Supervisory Commission, Financial 
Supervisory Service)  
  Introduction of a deposit insurance (yet in order to a-
void moral hazard a limited deposit insurance is re-
commended)  
South Korean consulting service  
Stage 2  Liberalization of interest rates   South Korean consulting service   
  Abolition of remaining government influence on 
banks' credit policy (without restrictions that guaran-
tee solvency-oriented credit conduct)  
South Korean consulting service  
  Careful allowance of foreign capital inflows and fo-
reign banks' activities  
South Korean consulting service  
Stage 3  Liberalization of remaining capital barriers and full 
entry for foreign banks  
South Korean consulting service  
a) An additional South Korean contribution – which is not part of banking system transformation – could 
be, similar to the German unification experience, the financing and consulting of North Korean industrial 





The South Korean contributions to the banking transformation in North Korea in the 
right column of table 6 disclose some lessons that can be learnt from the German unifi-
cation – despite differences in the prerequisites mentioned in the former section. One of 
them is the way West German banks have contributed successfully to transform existing 
socialist banks in East Germany into market-oriented banks via a system of "god-
fatherhood". South Korean banks could act as such kind of godfather for existing inter-
mediaries in North Korea. However, due to present banking deficits in South Korea the-
se contributions may be limited. This is a further reason why South Korean banks 
should be restructured and catch-up with Western banking competitiveness as soon as 
possible or in other words: The more competitive the South Korean banking system will 
be at the time of unification, the more successful the banking transformation in North 
Korea could be implemented.  
 
As a preparation for the above described reform process in North Korea, it would be wi-
se to make contacts with northern financial institutions now. The South Korean go-
vernment should encourage banks to engage in the North. However, this requires an 
agreement from Pyongyang about this kind of external influence, making this an issue 
for negotiations between Seoul and Pyongyang in 2001. In fact, North Korea can im-
prove domestic financial intermediation by allowing external assistance (not just by 
South Korean assistance but also by the help from other countries).30 Therefore, it will 
be necessary that South Korean banks as well as foreign banks open representative of-
fices in the North to consult local institutions. Additionally, a limited credit business for 
southern and foreign banks would promote the reform process and in this way contribu-
te to an economic recovery in the North. Another improvement would be the opening of 
representative offices of North Korean financial institutions abroad, at least in South 
Korea. Also, an exchange of central bank staff between Seoul and Pyongyang should be 
implemented in order to increase mutual knowledge and confidence.  
 
Altogether, if a unification can be started a gradual transition process in North Korea is 
both realistic (since the government in Pyongyang is rather stable at present) and re-
commended (because of economic disparities between North and South Korea including 
southern banking problems). In this section some major characteristics have been sket-
ched to prepare for or to implement this sort of gradual transition. However, despite the 
present political stability in North Korea, a fundamental change cannot be precluded. If 
the situation in Pyongyang collapsed, there would hardly be another choice for South 
Korea than to contribute to a dynamic transition. A major reason for this need is migra-
tion, which has to be prevented.  
 
                                                 




c)  Banking takeover in a dynamic unification process under foreign assistance – 
scenario 2 
 
Seoul is located very close to the inner-Korean border, making the South Korean capital 
highly attractive for emigrating North Koreans. If the border was opened in the same 
way as the Berlin Wall in November 1989, a migration could occur, which would be 
much stronger than the one in Germany. And considering the high population-density 
already existent in South Korea, and especially in Seoul, a migration from the North 
could hardly be handled. Therefore, it can be assumed that the South Korean govern-
ment will make an effort to keep the border closed or at least allow only a limited im-
migration. However, this will increase the responsibility of the South Korean govern-
ment with respect to a participation in a dynamic transition process in the North that 
would enable the northern part to catch-up with the South Korean economic develop-
ment in the long-run.  
 
In case of a sudden North Korean collapse the necessary reform measures would not be 
very different from those described in table 6, though the speed might be much higher. 
Thus, parallels to the German banking unification would be more existent, too. South 
Korea would be forced to make an effort to implement a successful banking transforma-
tion to stabilize the North Korean economy. This implies a kind of takeover of the 
North Korean banking system by the South, which may resemble the German model 
from 1990. Yet this process could only be executed successfully if the present weaknes-
ses in the South Korean banking were overcome or were be compensated by other sour-
ces. Such compensation could be foreign assistance by international institutions as the 
World Bank and the IMF or direct investments of foreign banks in North Korea. The 
latter case would mean that a reform measure proposed in the former section for the la-
ter phase of transformation should be implemented earlier.  
 
Aid by the World Bank and the IMF could be given in both financial and technical 
respects (credits and for example consulting services for establishing a banking supervi-
sion or efficient development banks). These international institutions would play the ro-
le West Germany's government (including the Bundesbank) had acted in 1990. Similar-
ly, foreign banks could ease the burden of South Korean banks in the transformation of 
North Korean financial institutions and, thus, would take on a part of the role West 
German banks played in 1990. In fact, foreign banks could significantly contribute to an 
efficient financial development in North Korea, as it is known by South Korean expe-
riences that foreign banks can allocate funds more efficiently than domestic banks due 
to a highly educated staff that is more independent from government orders than do-
mestic bankers (MÜLLER 2000). However, a free competition of the foreign entrants 
might be favorable in terms of a more competitive and efficient banking system, yet lo-




is also known by South Korean experiences that foreign banks wish to focus business 
on just a few market segments (large corporations and foreign corporations) and neglect 
major business fields like small and medium corporations or private individuals.31 Con-
sequently, foreign banks cannot act as a substitution for strong domestic banks. In addi-
tion, the entrance of foreign banks implies serious risks for the banking stability as long 
as existing domestic intermediaries are burdened with bad loans, excessive staff, a lack 
of banking knowledge etc.32 Thus, a symbiosis of foreign and domestic institutions in 
the form of joint ventures is recommended. Here different choices or combinations to 
found new banks or to restructure existing intermediaries are possible: joint ventures 
between (1) North Korean banks and foreign banks or (2) North and South Korean 
banks or (3) South Korean banks and foreign banks.33  
 
All this could contribute to a competitive banking system in North Korea that is unified 
with the South Korean one. Of course, it will not be easy to attract sufficient invest-
ments and international aid but without these contributions the prospects for a North 
Korean financial and economic development would be even more uncertain.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION   
 
The successful example of German banking unification is hardly suitable to serve at 
present as a model for the banking unification in Korea. The situation in Korea is in se-
veral respects quite different from the German one. Especially South Korea's still re-
maining problems in the banking sector exemplify a serious obstacle, which demands a 
more gradual strategy. Nevertheless, the German experience could be used for the Ko-
rean unification – but with care.  
 
The German banking unification has proved that a transformation could be achieved 
successfully if the government is able to provide financial compensations, if a strong 
banking supervision exists to avoid weak lending practices, if there are institutional pa-
rallels between the unifying banking systems and if finally one of these systems is fi-
nancially healthy enough to execute the unification. Obviously, South Korea has to rein-
force and complete its own banking restructuring to improve the prerequisites for a uni-
fication. Otherwise, if the unification already takes place before the restructuring is 
                                                 
31 For a comprehensive investigation of foreign banks' performance in the South Korean banking system 
see MÜLLER (1999).  
32 In several Central Eastern European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, the 
Slovak Republic) governments were highly reluctant to allow foreign competition as long as internal 
problems in domestic financial institutions were not solved – however, a too strong restriction on fo-
reign banks' entry hampers the banking system restructuring due to a lack of competitive pressure for 
existing intermediaries (BORISH/DING/NOËL 1997, pp. 49-77).  
33 A further possible construction could be a joint venture between North and South Korean as well as 




completed, a comprehensive international assistance would be an unavoidable ingre-
dient to implement banking unification. Thus, the main lesson with respect to the unifi-
cation time is the following: The sooner the Korean unification occurs (or the weaker 
the banking system in South Korea is at the moment of the unification), the greater will 
be the need for an external assistance functioning in a similar way like the strong West 
German banks and the West German state in East Germany in 1990.  
 
So far it has been assumed that the two Korean states would come to an agreement a-
bout a unification or a political change, which would make a soon transition process ne-
cessary. However, even if both countries will not agree on unification a banking coope-
ration would be suitable to promote a cooperation in the industrial sector. In fact, it is 
not entirely a question of unification or not to cooperate in both financial and industrial 
terms. As neighboring regions both Korean states have significant incentives to coope-
rate. And due to the shortage of financial resources in North Korea as well as significant 
investment risks for South Korean corporations investing in the North, an economic 
cooperation should be accompanied by sound banks.  
 
Consequently, it will be a further – and major issue – for political negotiations between 
the two Korean administrations to involve banking (or the financial system) into eco-
nomic cooperation. At present this seems to be a very difficult job, in particularly owing 
to the still remaining structural problems in the South Korean banking systems, but also 
to an overall skepticism regarding commercial banking in the North. Nevertheless, it is 
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Table A1:  
Total external assets and liabilities (in billion US$)  










End  of  1997  159 96  64 105 -54 
End  of  1998  149  118 31 129 -20 
End  of  1999  135 98  38 146 11 
End  of  2000  136 92  44 167 31 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy  
 
Table A2:  
Status of institutional restructuring end of August 2000 (in number of intermediaries)  
Type of resolution    Existing 
institutions in 
Dec. 1997 (A) 








Banks   33  5  6  11  -  22 
Merchant Banks   30  18  3  21  -  9 















Insurance companies   45  5  7  12  1  34 
Source: Bank of Korea  
 
Table A3:  
Major economic indicators  
Year GDP  growth 
rate  
(per cent)  
Unemploy-
ment rate  
(per cent)  
Inflation rate  
(per cent)  
Current ac-
count  





1997 5.0  2.6  4.5  -8.2  8.8 
1998 -5.8  6.8  7.5  40.5  48.5 
1999 10.7  6.3  0.8  25.0  74.1 
2000 9.0  4.1  2.3  11.0  96.2 





Table A4:  
Government debt/gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000  
  Initial government debt/GDP (in per cent)  
Indonesia   83.3 
Korea   33.9 
Malaysia   52.5 
Thailand   62.6 
Source: SALOMON SMITH BARNEY (2000)  
 